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The purpose of this paper is to raise questions regarding the methods and findings 
of a study of dispute settlement institutions in Asia in the book titled “The Role of Law 
and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic Development 1965-1995.”1  Initiated by and 
published for Asian Development Bank, the book examines the correlation between legal 
development and economic development during 1960-1995 in six Asian economies: 
China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan.  The research in the book consists of 
three studies: the relationship between corporate law and capital formation, the 
relationship between security interest law and lending, and the relationship between 
dispute settlement institutions and economic development.  I will, inter alia, focus on the 
study of the relationship between dispute settlement institutions (DSIs) and economic 
development (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Study’), for the Study contains interesting 
implications for our joint research project. 
 
First, I will overview the framework of the Study, introducing methods used and 
findings therein.  Second, I will raise questions regarding findings of the Study about 
Japan, and third, discuss the method used in the Study to analyze the correlation between 
                                                 
* Researcher, Institute of  Developing Economies (IDE), Japan. 
1  Katharina Pistor and Philip A. Wellons, The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic 
Development 1965-1995, Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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dispute settlement institutions and socioeconomic development.  Finally, I will present 
remarks about our joint research project on dispute settlement institutions. 
 
I. Overview of the Study 
 
1. Purpose of the Study 
Western historical experience suggests that the availability of effective and low-
cost dispute settlement is an important condition for expanding markets, for meeting the 
increasing complexity of economic development, and thus ultimately for economic 
development itself.  In order to prove that this experience also applies to Asia, the Study 
analyzes the role of legal institutions, in particular the role of courts in Asian economic 
development, focusing on the role of dispute settlement institutions in resolving 
commercial disputes between non-state parties. 
 
 
2. Samples used in the Study 
To analyze the importance of formal DSIs, the Study collected data on litigation, 
the total number of civil cases. [See Table 1 for Japan.] Litigation rates indicate the 
demand for DSIs.  The demand for dispute settlements in the courts, however, may be 
determined not only by the willingness but also by the availability of DSIs.  Therefore, 
the Study also presents data on the number of courts at different levels and the number of 
judges. 
 
3. Methods used in the Study 
The Study tests the proposition that formal dispute settlement will become more 
important with increasing division of labor.  The Study ranks the six economies on a 
common scale. [See Table 2.]  To measure the division of labor, the Study selected three 
indicators that are summarized in a cumulative index on a scale from zero to ten, called 
the Division of Labor Index.  The three indicators are (i) the share of the population in 
urban areas; (ii) the share of the population engaged in agriculture (negative indicator); 
(iii) the share of the population above the age of 25 that has completed primary and 
secondary education. These indicators measure the diversification of economic activities, 
which is typically higher in urban than in rural areas as well as in sectors outside 
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agriculture.  Education levels reflect the level of human capital available for more diverse 
economic activities.  The Study seeks a correlation between the Division of Labor Index 
and the litigation rates in six economies. 
 
4. Findings in comparison across economies 
The Study’s findings are summarized as follows: (1) Over the long term, rates for 
litigation concerning civil and commercial disputes increased in all economies.  The 
Study found a positive and statistically significant correlation between per capita 
litigation rates and indicators for the division of labor.  [See Table 3.] It suggests that 
with economic development, legal institutions will perform increasingly similar functions 
throughout the world.  (2) Still, litigation rates vary considerable across economies.  The 
variations cannot be explained by economic development, or the extent to which division 
of labor has been achieved in these economies.  For example, litigation rates in Japan in 
particular have remained much lower than in the other high performing economies.  (3) 
Nor do institutional constraints explain differences in litigation rates.  Comparing 
litigation rates in Japan with those of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, it is 
demonstrated that even when these countries share civil law tradition and a legacy of 
state imposed ceilings for the legal profession, litigation rates can vary considerably.  
This puzzle of persistent divergence is not solved. 
 
 
II. Questions on Findings about Japan 
 
1. Statistical question on Japan’s low litigation rate 
The data in the Study are limited to the number of civil litigations in first instance 
courts, and the Study explains that the reasons for the low number of civil litigations are 
culture and institutional barriers, including control mechanisms the state exercises over 
the judiciary.  The Study did not refer to the court-connected mediation, which is 
significant in terms of the number of cases and the outcome available. 
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One distinctive feature of the Japanese court system is that it provides court-
connected mediation. 2 According to the data in 1999, the number of civil litigation cases 
filed in courts (district courts and summary courts) was 523,000 in total, whereas 264,000 
civil mediation cases3 were filed in courts (summary courts and district courts).  The 
number of civil cases filed in court-connected mediation is equivalent to more than half 
of all civil cases. 
 
An agreement between the parties in court-connected mediation has the same 
legal effect as settlement in litigation.  When the parties do not reach an agreement, the 
court may render a decision if it is deemed necessary for resolving the dispute.  If no 
party objects to the decision within 2 weeks from its notification, the decision will also 
have the same effect as settlement in litigation.  In litigation, almost half of all litigation 
cases end in settlement without rulings. 4  Though the litigation procedure differs from 
court-connected mediation procedure, in many cases both produce outcomes with the 
same legal effects, i.e. settlement in litigation, that is to be enforced as final judgment. 
 
The number of court-connected mediation cases is significant and cannot be 
ignored in researching litigation in Japan.  Limiting the statistics to the number of 
litigation cases filed does not necessarily reflect litigation propensity or institutional 
barriers of courts.  People might bring a suit with the aim of settling in litigation, and also 
might use courts for mediation to obtain the same results that they would obtain by 
bringing a suit.  Therefore, the figure in the Study may not necessarily reflect accurately 
the litigation preference of Japanese people.  Looking at the similar outcomes resulting 
from litigation and court-connected mediation cases, suggests the need to adjust the 
number of litigation cases by taking court-connected mediation into consideration. 
                                                 
2 In a court-connected mediation, a judge sits with two mediators appointed from among non-judges. 
The qualifications of mediators are (1) to be an attorney, (2) to be able to provide useful and well-
versed knowledge and experience in resolving civil disputes, or (3) to possess valuable life 
experience, and be aged more than 40 and less than 70.  Minji Chotei Hou (Code of Civil Mediation 
Law), Minji-Chotei-Iin Kisoku (Rules of Civil Mediation Members) 
3 This number excludes family cases. 
4 Naohisa Hirota, “ADR as Dispute Settlement Means in Comparison with Litigation” (in Japanese), 
No.1207 Jurist, 2001. 
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2. Questions on analysis of Japan’s low litigation rate 
The comparison of litigation rates in the Study is based on the premise that in the 
societies with similar social structures and in similar economic development stages, the 
number of disputes per unit of population would be approximately the same.  On this 
premise the litigation rate is calculated by dividing the number of litigation cases by the 
population, and the rate is deemed to be litigation propensity in the society.  The Study 
found that the record of civil, including commercial litigation, in Japan between 1960 and 
1995 casts some doubt on theories suggesting that commercial litigation increases with 
the expansion and increase of complexity of economies.  The fact remains that in 
comparison with other highly industrialized economies in the West, but also, in 
comparison with other Asian economies, the propensity to litigate in Japan has been low.  
The Study attributes the comparatively low litigation rate in Japan to its culture and 
institutional barriers. 
 
It is said that in contrast to Western culture, Japanese culture, with its emphasis on 
harmony, influences the preference for mediation and conciliation rather than litigation, 
which is deemed to be hostile.  However, examples proving the contrary are also found:  
e.g. Christian ethics to deter litigation and social conventions to avoid impetuous 
litigation in the US business community.5  Further, in the US, where the litigation rate is 
comparatively high, most of the litigation cases filed end up in settlement, with less than 
10% proceeding to trial. 6  Thus, it is not easy to make a sharp contrast between Japanese 
culture and Western culture, harmony on one hand and confrontation on the other hand. 
 
The Study presented institutional barriers as another reason for the low litigation 
rate in Japan.  Institutional barriers are often shaped by culture, but they may also reflect 
the political interests of the governing elite, as opposed to the economic or cultural 
preference of disputing non-state parties.  The strong evidence for the existence of 
institutional barriers is the control over the size of the legal profession, including judges 
                                                 
5 Yasuo Watanabe et al., Textbook Modern Judiciary (in Japanese) Nihonhyoronsha, 2000. 
6 Takeshi Kojima, Out-of-court Dispute Settlement and the Rule of Law (in Japanese) Yuhikaku, 
2000. 
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and attorneys. 7  However, as admitted by the Study itself, as similar constraints have not 
led to the same outcome in other economies (Korea, Taiwan), institutional barriers alone 
are not a sufficient explanation for the low litigation rate in Japan. 
 
Predictability in dispute settlements would be another factor to cause the low 
litigation rate. 8   Parties would settle their disputes by means that would rationally 
maximize their wealth.  When both parties can foresee the outcome of litigation and the 
plaintiff can recover damages outside litigation, litigation would be avoided as the result 
of rational judgment made by the parties.  Ramseyer proved this assumption in traffic 
accident cases in Japan, where a developed insurance system is available. 9   It is 
concluded that a low litigation rate does not necessarily mean that people do not pursue 
their legal rights.  If apart from litigation there are more effective and lower cost 
mechanisms that would enable the parties to fulfill their rights, culture and institutional 
barriers are insufficient to explain the low litigation rate in Japan.  
 
 
 
III. Questions on Analysis Methods 
 
1. Definition of dispute settlement institutions 
The Study is based on the premise that the availability of effective and low-cost 
dispute settlement is an important condition for expanding markets with complex 
business transactions.  In other words, as markets expand, formal institutions that have 
the power to enforce their rulings against parties unwilling to comply voluntarily become 
more important.  In the West, that is the court system.  Partly due to the lack of data, 
therefore, the Study dealt with only formal DSIs, i.e. litigation in court systems 
established by states.  However, if the Study intends to examine the relationship between 
effective and low-cost dispute settlement and the expansion of markets, the Study does 
not necessarily have to limit its subject to the court system. There are DSIs other than 
                                                 
7 Frank K. Upham, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan, Harvard University Press, 1987. 
8 Supra note 5. 
9 Mark Ramseyer, Law and Economics (in Japanese) Kobundo, 1990. 
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courts that could certainly serve as mechanisms to solve disputes effectively at low cost.  
In fact, the court system, which is believed to be effective and less costly, is often found 
not to be the case even in Western countries. 
 
When we study a particular DSI, we need to define the institution as it is 
distinguished from other institutions.  Otherwise, we will not be able to analyze the 
reasons why the particular institution is used or not used.  The Study contrasted litigation 
as a Western system against conciliation/mediation as an Asian system. However, the 
dichotomy between litigation and other dispute settlement institutions is not easy to 
establish. We can find conciliation/mediation elements in the litigation process in the 
Western countries such as the US 10  and England 11 .  In Japan, the court-connected 
mediation also provides the parties with a forum where, with professional advice on 
issues, they estimate the time and cost in case of litigation and foresee the outcome, 
considering several determining factors such as enforceability.  Whereas the pretrial 
conference is a part of litigation, the court-connected mediation is not within litigation.  
As DSIs, however, they may share similar functions in seeking a possibility of 
settlement.12  When a case is filed in a court and then referred to other dispute settlement 
means, whether inside or outside the court, we cannot conclude that the dispute in the 
case filed is resolved by the court.  We cannot, therefore, draw the conclusion that the 
                                                 
10 Federal Civil Procedure Rules 16 (amended 1983, 1987, 1993) explicitly recognizes that it has 
become commonplace to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences.  Since it obviously eases 
crowded court dockets and results in savings to the litigants and the judicial system, settlement 
should be facilitated at as early stage of the litigation as possible.  Although the Rule does not 
impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants, it is believed that providing a neutral forum 
for discussing the subject might foster it.  For instance, a judge may arrange, on his own motion or 
at a party’s request, to have settlement conferences handled by another member of the court or by a 
magistrate.  In addition to settlement, the Rule refers to exploring the use of procedures other than 
litigation to resolve the disputes. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1983 amendments to Rules. 
11 The Civil procedure (Amendment) Rules 1999 provides that when appropriate, a judge may 
recommend that the parties use alternative means other than litigation.  The purpose of the pretrial 
conference is by discovery at an earlier stage to enable the parties to foresee the outcome of the 
disputes so that they may be able to avoid litigation in cases where they might incur wasteful time 
and costs. 
12 The significance of the pretrial conference is facilitated by the discovery system, which Japanese 
court-connected mediation lacks.  Settlement in pretrial conference is deemed a contract between 
the parties, unlike settlement in litigation in Japan, which is equivalent to final judgment.  In terms 
of technical accuracy, comparison of the systems in this paper is insufficient and needs further 
study. 
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increasing number of cases filed reflects the increasing significance of the court’s role in 
dispute settlement. 
 
For a study of effective and low-cost institutions for settling disputes, both 
litigation and non-litigation institutions need to be covered.  If we narrow our study to 
litigation only, it is necessary to define the significance of the court system, which other 
DSIs do not have.  Is it the state’s power to enforce the ruling against parties unwilling to 
comply voluntarily? Would social sanction serve as a third-party power to enforce in 
cases other than litigation?  Defining the significance of each DSI, we will be able to 
articulate their relationships to socioeconomic development. 
 
2. Function of DSI 
When we look at the statistics of cases in DSIs, it is necessary to distinguish the 
functions of each institution, such as function to receive cases, function to settle cases, 
and function to enforce rulings.  The statistics to be selected would differ depending on 
functions.  In order to examine how DSIs function in settling disputes by statistics, it is 
suggested to classify the following: a) the number of cases filed, b) the number of cases 
settled by ruling, c) the number of cases transferred to other institutions, and d) the 
number of cases withdrawn. 
 
When a plaintiff brings a suit and succeeds in collecting his claims by 
enforcement of judgment, we can conclude that the number of cases filed actually shows 
the number of cases where the court functions to settle disputes.  This, however, is not 
always the case. When a case is filed but transferred to institutions outside the court and 
settled there, the number of cases filed does not reflect the court’s function as dispute 
settlement institutions.  Data on the number of cases filed is, therefore, not sufficient to 
prove that the court functions as a dispute settling institution.  If the Study focuses on the 
court system because the court system entails the power to enforce rulings, the number of 
cases settled by ruling and the number of cases enforced should be surveyed, not just the 
number of cases filed. 
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3. Factors determining litigation rate 
The Study is based on the premise that as markets expand and the complexity of 
impersonal transactions increase, disputes between parties who do not belong to the same 
ethnicity or trade will increase, and thus, the number of litigations will increase as well.  
This assumes that in the societies with similar social structures and in similar economic 
development stages, the number of disputes per unit of population would be 
approximately the same. 
 
In reality, however, the number of disputes would be determined by numerous 
variables.  For example, the rate of defective products would differ in different countries, 
and a lack of a particular system such as land registration would contribute to an increase 
in disputed cases.  In order to calculate litigation rates precisely, we need to distinguish 
the factors determining the number of litigations from the factors causing disputes.  In 
calculating the litigation rate, the denominator should be the total number of disputes 
occurring and the numerator should be the number of disputes that are brought before 
courts.  Thus, in order to obtain an accurate litigation rate, not only dividing the number 
of litigations by population, but further, we need to consider various factors to adjust the 
statistics. 
 
4. Division of labor index 
In the Study, to test the proposition that formal dispute settlement will become 
more important with increasing division of labor, the six economies are ranked according 
to a cumulative index on a scale from zero to ten, consisting of three indicators: i) the 
share of the population in urban areas, ii) the share of the population engaged in 
agriculture (negative indicator), and iii) the share of the population above the age of 25 
that has completed primary and secondary education.  These three indicators are believed 
to represent the diversification of economic activities. The Study concluded that there 
existed a positive correlation that was statistically significant between litigation rates and 
the three measurements for the division of labor. 
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It should be noted that the finding does not provide a direct causal link between 
the litigation rate and the division of labor index.  The division of labor index alone 
cannot explain the increase of litigation rate unless it also considers what factors 
contribute to choosing litigation other than non-litigation methods and what factors deter 
such choices as well.  The Study itself, however, admits that civil and commercial 
litigation is a more complex matter than a simple function of labor in society and the 
supply of court institutions. 
 
In order to find a correlation between market expansion and increase in litigation 
rates, I suggest a research with a limited scope targeting business entities and commercial 
disputes, instead of viewing the society as a whole. Samples of business entities can be 
classified by the number of their clients, the geographical expansion of their markets and 
the volume of trading.  Then we would survey commercial disputes they are involved in 
and how they resolve them, whether by litigation or other means, and the reason for such 
means.  The result would be more accurate and credible for proving the correlation 
between market expansion and increase in litigation rates in a particular context of 
commercial transactions. 
 
A fundamental question about the Study is whether increasing division of labor 
equates with socio-economic development.  The Division of Labor Index adopted in the 
Study is based on the premise that the increase of urban population, decrease of 
agricultural population, and increase of population with education represent the increase 
of markets and more complex economic transactions.  Expanding markets and increasing 
complexity of economic transactions are only limited aspects of economic development.  
In order to measure socio-economic development, we need more indicators. 
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IV. For Further Research 
 
The Study tested the proposition that a court system modeled after and 
transplanted from the West would play an important role in economic development as it 
did in the West.  It assumed the same economic development path would be followed by 
Asian countries and overlooked their variety.  In fact, Asian countries track different 
respective paths in their socio-economic development and possess a variety of DSIs. 
 
For further research on how DSIs evolve in response to changes in the 
socioeconomic environment, it will be necessary to analyze the interaction between the 
propensity to litigate or to use other institutions within a specific environment of a given 
country and outcomes available in each institution.  After the Asian economic crisis, 
many Asian countries have undergone judicial reforms, and a variety of dispute 
resolution systems are drawing attention.  With the increasing complexity of economic 
development, dispute settlement institutions are needed to handle not only commercial 
transactions but also disputes arising from diversified interests in societies.  Labor 
disputes, consumer protection disputes and environmental disputes reflect drastically 
changing modern societies.  Our joint research on these cases will find how DSIs play 
important roles in present Asian societies. 
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Table 1 Civil Litigation 
 
 Cases filed 
Year Number PMP 
1962 132,191 14.0 
1966 169,979 17.3 
1970 175,164 17.0 
1974 149,688 13.5 
1978 156,505 13.6 
1982 244,069 20.5 
1986 335,679 27.6 
1990 210,178 17.0 
PMP = per million people 
Source: Excerpt from Pistor and Wellons, p.230.
  
Table 2   Division of Labor Index, 1960 and 1995 
 
Indicators 
 
Share of 
population 
in urban areas 
(percent) 
 
Share of 
labor force 
in agricultural 
sectors (percent) 
 
Mean years of 
secondary 
education 
 Cumulative index 
Economy           1960 1995 1960 1995 1960 1995 1960 1995
PRC             18.2 30.3 80.8 73.5 0.96a 1.56
Index
 
            
           
2 4 2 3 8 9 4.0 5.3
India 18.8 26.8 72.9 64.1 0.12 0.84
  Index            
            
2 3 3 4 2 8 2.3 5.0
Japan 67.3 77.6 26.4 7.2 1.87 3.06
  Index 9 10  8 10  10 10  9.0 10.0 
Korea, Republic of 32.4 81.3  55.1 18.1  0.97 3.47    
  Index 4 10  5 9  8 10  5.7 9.7 
Malaysia            29.9 53.7 58.6 64.0 0.49 1.63
  Index            
            
4 8 4 8 6 9 4.7 8.3
Taiwan 51.0b 63.0 46.5 12.8 0.92 2.49
  Index            8 9 6 9 8 10 7.3 9.3
a. Education estimate for PRC is based on 1975 data. 
b. Population estimate for Taipei, China is based on 1974 data. 
Source: Pistor and Wellons’ calculations based on ‘World Development Indicators’ The World Bank (1997). 
  
Table 3 Demand and Supply of DSIs in Lower and Intermediate Level 
Courts in Asia, 1960 and 1995 
 
 Litigation rates (PMP)  Number of judges (PMP) 
Economy Type of cases 1960 1995  1960 1995
PRCa Commercial at lower and 
intermediate levels 461.8 1,124.0  ― 137.5
a
India Civil at lower levels 489.6 1,209.0  5.5 10.9
Japan Civil at all levels 1,782.7 3,386.8  25.2 22.8
Korea, Republic of All civil expert family cases 1,194.0 14,713.0  11.6 27.0
Malaysia Civil at lower and 
intermediate levels   ― 17,850.0  7.1 15.3
b
Taipei, China All civil including family 17,420.0 37,660.0  32.4 57.1
Commercial only 694.4 865.5      
PMP= per million people 
a.  Numbers for PRC are based on estimates.  Note that many who serve as judges do not have full legal training. 
b. Data for Malaysia are for 1990. 
Source: Pistor and Wellons, p.246. 
 
 
 
  
